Locking down device access to Azure AD
entities. Two of them are particularly good ideas to limit how a domain can be accessed and will create significant hurdles for criminals
entities. Two of them are particularly good ideas to limit how a domain can be accessed and will create significant hurdles for criminals
Remember when people stood on their soapbox and said that Microsoft should make things secure by default for everyone? That's device encryption.
Recently, we've noticed more USA based attacks. Using MCAS we can block those attempts
If you're mhklassen@aol.com, your account has been compromised and is being used by criminals to attack my website. I do hold you responsible because you've ignored that message to change your password to something more complex and use two-factor authentication.
What if we want both low and high severity alerts from a policy? Technically MCAS can't do this.
do I dare ignore what I see in the logs if my AV is giving me a clean bill of health? Can I really afford to rebuild this server when things seem mostly ok?
There's been a lively discussion with "breaking news" about the extent of the intrusion into networks and the solution to it over on our Ransomware and Security group. Now that it seems to have reached a stable information point I thought I would summarize that you need to know.
A couple of situations have given rise to the need to prevent the downloading of data to untrusted devices.
Preventing the AutoForwarding of email off of your domain is a security staple. But now we need to do it with Theat Management policy instead of exchange transport rules
In this survey Acronis has partnered with Third Tier to gather some information on how MSP's are progressing in addressing security, what's holding them back and what their plans are.
...do you use a third party filtering service in front of M365? No, I don't and here's why.
This month I covered a whirlwind of email security settings.